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LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF ADR AND ARBITRATION
IN EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
Evan J. Spelfogel"

I.

INTRODUCTION

A gross miscalculation by management, labor and employment
lawyers thirty years ago has revealed itself in today's judicial backlog. During the debates leading up to enactment of Title VII of the
P ' it was proposed that discrimCivil Rights Act of 1964 ('Title VII"),
ination on account of race, sex, national origin and religion be added
as unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA").' Alternatively, it was proposed that the about to be created Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") be patterned after the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), with exclusive jurisdiction over race, sex, national origin and religious discrimination, preempting all state and local human rights laws and
much state common law wrongful discharge litigation, and that the
EEOC General Counsel be given non-reviewable discretion over
whether to issue complaints under the statute.
As under the NLRA, complaints alleging Title VII discrimination
would be heard by administrative law judges, with appeals to the
EEOC and then to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals available. Management representatives in 1963, however, looked at the NLRB and
its general counsel then in office and, fearing political "oppression,"
opted for a relatively powerless EEOC, leaving the parties to turn to
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the courts for their remedies.
The legal landscape has changed dramatically over the past twenty to thirty years. There are upwards of 800,000 lawyers3 in the
United States and more than eighteen million new lawsuits filed each
year.' Our legal system is presently costing consumers three hundred
billion dollars a year and significantly affects America's world-wide
competitiveness.'
Increasingly in the employment arena, employees are acting out
of anger and frustration with their employers, filing discrimination
proceedings with governmental agencies and going to court in search
of large sums in damages.
Employment litigation has grown at a rate many times greater
than litigation in general. Twenty times more employment discrimination cases were filed in 1990 than in 1970, almost one thousand
percent greater than the increase in all other types of civil litigation
combined.6 There is currently a backlog of over one hundred thousand employment discrimination cases at the EEOC, with new cases
coming in at a rate which is 20% greater than that of last year
alone.7 Discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") 8 now account for 13% of the EEOC's overall case load
and are increasing by geometric progression, averaging one thousand
new cases per month.9 The 1200 charges filed under the ADA in
February 1993 nearly doubled the number filed just a few months
earlier, and was 30% higher than in January. 0 The EEOC has been
forced to seek a 15 to 20% percent increase in its 1993 budget to
pay for the investigators and support staff needed to handle this avalanche.

3.

Robert F. Drinan, The Struggle Never Ends, T'x. LAW., Sept. 6, 1993, at 13.

4. Henry J. Reske, Record State Caseloads in 1990, 78 A.B.A. J. 23 (1992).
5. Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Plaintiff Attorneys' Great Honey Rush,
FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 197.
6. Mark Hansen, Study Shows Job Bias Changing: As Judges Wrestle With Pinups and
Massages, Litigation Skyrockets, 91 A.B.A. J. 34 (1991).
7. John J. Donohue M & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. RE. 983, 985 (1991); EEOC's Pilot Mediation Program
Off to Slow Start, Official Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), May 4, 1993, at A-14, A-15; Robert Layton et al., Using Compulsory Arbitration to Resolve EEOC Disputes, N.Y.LJ., July 14,
1992, at 1.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1991).
9. EEOC's Pilot Mediation Program Off to Slow Start, Official Says, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), May 4, 1993, at A-14, A-15.
10. Disability Complaints Exceed Predictions at EEOC; Resolutions are Slow on New
Law, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 29, 1993, at A-7.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol11/iss1/6

2

Spelfogel: Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in Employ
1993]

ADR and Arbitration in Employment Disputes

Currently, there are over 25,000 wrongful discharge cases pending in state and federal courts. Nearly all of these cases involve jury
trials, with unpredictable results. Possible recovery of punitive damages in these cases makes settlements difficult. Studies indicate that
plaintiffs win nearly 70% of these cases and that the average jury
award for a wrongfully fired employee is now over $600,000." The
amended Civil Rights Act of 199112 expands the right to jury trials
and dramatically broadens the remedies available to victims of intentional discrimination. The impact of these new statutory developments
has yet to be felt, but will certainly lead to even more litigation,
more delays in plaintiffs being able to obtain their day in court, and
greater expense to American businesses.
Alternate dispute resolution ("ADR") - including final and
binding arbitration - and judicial enforcement of such programs is,
thus, an increasingly attractive and practical necessity.
II. FORMs OF ADR
A. Judicial ADR
Variations of ADR are becoming increasingly available as an
ancillary part of judicial proceedings.13 These include, for example:
1. Early neutral evaluation presided over by a court
appointed attorney who evaluates and attempts to reduce the
scope of the dispute and assist the parties in settlement or
pretrial procedures;
2. Judicial arbitrationbefore an arbitrator, magistrate or
master whose decision may or may not be binding, depending upon the agreement of parties;
3.
Binding summary jury trials involving attorney summary presentation quoting from affidavits and depositions
but without live witness testimony; and
4. Non-binding mini-trials presented before an attorney,
clerk or other neutral third party moderator appointed by the
11. Layton et al., supra note 7.
12. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
13. The Southern District of New York has a pilot program in which certain cases are
submitted to mandatory mediation. In the Eastern District of New York, cases involving
claims of less than $100,000 ar submitted to non-binding arbitration. There is authority for
state court mandatory arbitration under N.Y. CoMP. CODES. R. & REGS., tit. 22, §§ 28.1-.16
(1986).
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court.
B. Extra-Judicial ADR
Many employers already have in place one or more variation of
informal alternate dispute resolution procedures. Examples of such
procedures include:
1. Employee communications systems;
2. Employee participation programs ("Quality Circles");
3.
Employee assistance programs ("EAP's");
4. Employee counselling mechanisms;
5.
Peer group committees; and
6.
Mediation.
All of these are designed to enable employers to "listen" to
employee "grievances," or concerns, assist them with respect to both
work-related and personal problems, improve individual and group
working conditions and morale, and head off more serious problems
at an early stage.
Elf.

ARBrrATiON

More frequently employers are installing one of two types of
final and binding arbitration procedures: (i) voluntary arbitration on
an ad hoc basis, elected by an employee after a dispute has arisen,
and after the exhaustion of other specified internal grievance procedures; or (ii) mandatory arbitration of all employment related disputes
which is written into employment contracts, employee handbooks,
manuals, job applications and other writings, and is binding upon the
employer, employees and applicants for employment.
In either case, key questions include: (i) whether, and to what
degree, an employer may hold employees or applicants to an
arbitrator's award - or to the obligation to submit disputes to arbitration - and bar litigation, particularly with respect to statutory
discrimination claims, and (ii) whether an ADR procedure may require an employee to exhaust internal pre-arbitration step procedures,
to adhere to time limitations as a pre-condition to requesting arbitration, or to preclude the employee from going directly to the courts.
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IV.

ALEXANDER V. GARDNER-DENVER CO.

4

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court held in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. that arbitration did not preclude a federal court
suit on statutory discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."s The Court noted, however, that federal district
judges may accord great weight to decisions of arbitrators and indi-6
cated, without referring to them by name, that the NLRB's Collyer'
and Spielberg"7 tests might be appropriate standards for deferral.
Gardner-Denver was later expanded to cover statutory employment

related claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 9 Sections 1981
and 1983 of the old Civil Rights Acts,' ERISA,2 and the Age Dis-

crimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). '
More recently however, signalling a major change, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld final and binding arbitration of statutory issues

in non-labor, commercial cases. These included statutory claims under
the Sherman Act,

securities laws'

and RICO.'

The Court also

upheld arbitration under ERISA.a

14. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
15. Id.
16. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
17. Spielberg Mfg., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See also United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984) (reflecting the policy that the
NLRB will defer to arbitration proceedings which provide substantial due process and are not
inconsistent with the NLRA).
18. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 60 & n.21.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450
U.S. 728 (1981).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1988). See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S.
284 (1984) (§ 1983); Wilmington v. J.L Case Co., 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986) (§ 1981).
21. Zipf v. AT & T, 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
22. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Steck v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.NJ. 1987).
23. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
24. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
25. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
26. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc. v. Bird, 493 U.S. 885 (1989) (mem.) (distinguishing Gardner-Denver and remanding) appeal after remand, 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that the arbitration procedure barred a court suit). See also Fabian Fin. Serv.
v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 768 F. Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
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GILMER V. INTERSTATE/JOHNSON LANE CORP.2

Then, in 1991, in a seven to two decision, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court held that under the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),' the courts may compel arbitration
and dismiss litigation of age discrimination claims under certain individual, non-union arbitration agreements.' In so doing, the Court
chose not to expressly overrule Gardner-Denver, but rather distinguished it and its progeny away on the basis that those cases involved unions and collectively bargained arbitration provisions." A
union, the court stated, might have an agenda of its own, in conflict
with the interests of the individual employee."
The plaintiff in Gilmer was a former senior executive of Interstate who had signed a registration statement filed with the New York
Stock Exchange, commonly referred to as a "U-4" agreement.32 The
U-4 agreement required arbitration of all disputes.'
The Court rejected Gilmer's arguments that arbitration would not
provide an adequate forum to vindicate his rights, noting that applicable arbitration rules of the New York Stock Exchange provided
sufficiently comprehensive procedures to safeguard Gilmer's rights
and resolve his claims.' The Court also rejected Gilmer's arguments
pertaining to unequal bargaining power, lack of a voluntary agreement, and a failure of legal "consideration," notwithstanding Gilmer's
argument that he had no real choice: he either signed the exchange's
Registration Agreement, including the arbitration provision, or would
be barred from working in the industry.'
The Court held that the FAA placed arbitration agreements on

27.

111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).

28. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (Supp. 1992).
29. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (expressly distinguishing Gardner-Denver,Barrendne and City of West Branch).
30. Id. at 1656.
31. Id. (citing Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 58).
32. Id. at 1650.
33. Id. at 1651. The U-4 form "provided ...
that Gilmer 'agree[d] to arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy' arising between him and Interstate 'that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which [he] register."'
Since Gilmer was registered with the New York Stock Exchange, he was obligated by NYSE
Rule 347 to submit to arbitration any controversy between himself and any member organization which arose out of his employment or the termination of his employment. Id.
34. Id. at 1654-55.
35. Id. at 1655.
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the same footing as other contracts and evidenced a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements." It noted that the same defenses that could be raised to rescind other contracts - fraud, duress
and undue influence - would also be available in seeking recision of
arbitration agreements. 7 Gilmer, however, had not presented any evidence that he was coerced or defrauded into signing the U-4 agreement, and continued employment itself, the Court inferred, was sufficient legal consideration.38
VI. POST-GLER DEVELOPMENTS
The federal courts of appeals have now extended the Supreme
Court's age discrimination decision in Gilmer to racial and sex-based
discrimination claims arising under Title VII,39 and to statutory
claims under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. 4° Indeed, there
is no rational basis for distinguishing between the ADEA,4 the
Equal Pay Act,42 Title VII (including race, sex, national origin and
religion),43 and the Americans with Disabilities Act."
In addition, two courts have taken contrary positions with respect
to the exclusivity of the Railway Labor Act's arbitration provisions.
The Second Circuit held in Bates v. Long Island R.R.' that claims
under the federal law prohibiting disability discrimination by public
contractors are not preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"),
and that the arbitration procedures mandated by the RLA are not
exclusive. The Court cited as precedent Gardner-Denverand McDonald v. City of West Branch. The employer contended that since the
claims required interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement,
36. Id. at 1655-56.
37. Id. at 1656.
38. Id.
39. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Bender v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d
229 (5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991);
Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993). All these cases involved
U-4 agreements except Mago (employment application) and Scott (employment contract).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988). See Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,
968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992).
41. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
42. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
44. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991).
45. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
46. 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1993).
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they were "minor disputes" under the RLA that were required to be
handled under the exclusive dispute resolution procedures outlined in
the RLA.47
Conversely, a federal district court in California recently held
that the procedures of the RLA are exclusive and barred a religious
discrimination claim filed under Title VII. 8 This court stated that the
outcome was the logical result of the decision in Gilmer, and was in
accord with a similar decision by a court in Texas."
Several issues remain open in light of Gilmer (i) whether Gilmer
will be extended beyond Stock Exchange U-4 agreements, to cover
arbitration provisions contained in employment agreements, personnel
manuals and handbooks, and employment application forms, and (ii)
the meaning of the provision in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act which excepts from enforceable arbitration agreements, "contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
In the first post-Gilmer cases to focus on these issues, the First,
Third and Ninth Circuits have ruled that the FAA exception relates
narrowly to only those workers personally engaged in the actual
transportation of goods across state lines and that mandatory arbitration clauses in employee handbooks and individual employment
agreements are enforceable 1 While we await further court clarification, 2 there have been several legislative and administrative developments.

47. Bates, 997 F.2d at 1034.
48. Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., No. CV 92-4217 LGB, 1993 WL 409549
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1993).

49. Id. at *3 (referring to Newton v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 141 L.R.RM. (BNA)
2477 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 1992)).
50.

9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).

51. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc.,
956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Dancu v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992);
Corion Corp. v. Chen, 124 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
57,220 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 1991) appeal
denied, 964 F.2d 55 (Ist Cir. 1992).
52. A federal district court in California has held that a corporation's internal grievance
procedure was legally binding upon its employee and barred an employee's separate suit in
the federal court for wrongful discharge bolstering the legitimacy of dispute resolution procedures outlined in employee handbooks and similar documents. Delaney v. Continental Airlines
Corp., No. 92-762-GLT (C.D. Cal. June 22, 1993). See also Firing of Airline Supervisor
Upheld Despite Legal Dispute on Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), July 8. 1993, at D-5
(reporting Delaney).
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VII. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991" provides for the

use of ADR, including arbitration, to resolve disputes under that Act
or under provisions of federal law amended by it (thus encompassing
Title VII of the 1964 Act). Similarly, the miscellaneous provisions of
Title V of the Americans with Disabilities A' specifically encourage the use of ADR, including arbitration.
A question has arisen under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Ac 5 whether an employee may waive a prospective right with
respect to age discrimination claims. Whether this language will be
construed as only pertaining to waivers of "substantive rights," as
opposed to "procedural rights" such as forum selection, is not presently clear. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "by agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, the party does not forego substantive rights
afforded by these statutes; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than in a judicial forum. ''"
VIII.

FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY/ADMINISTRATVE ACTION

On November 15, 1990, Congress enacted the little-known Administrative Dispute Resolution Act." This Act, which terminates in
1995, states that any administrative agency of the United States "may
use a dispute resolution proceeding for the resolution of an issue in
controversy that relates to an administrative program, if the parties
agree to such proceeding.""8 Forms of dispute resolution allowed for
use by an administrative agency are "any procedure that is used...
to resolve issues in controversy, including, but not limited to, settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
mini-trials and arbitration." 9
Thereafter President Bush promulgated Executive Order 12778'
encouraging the utilization of voluntary dispute resolutions by federal

53. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. 1991).
55. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(Oct. 16, 1990).
56. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-581 (Supp. 1991).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 572 (Supp. 1991).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 571(3) (Supp. 1991).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
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agencies. The President suggested that claims should be resolved
through procedures other than formal ADR or court proceedings such
as "informal discussions, negotiations, and settlements."6 One motivation for the drafting of this order was to establish a model for
similar reform in the private sector and at the state level.'
Pursuant thereto, the EEOC has initiated a pilot ADR program in
Houston, Philadelphia, New Orleans and Washington, D.C. 3 This
voluntary program (which is currently being reviewed and evaluated)
utilizes outside mediators (not EEOC employees) to handle disputes.' The EEOC reserves jurisdiction and the right to resume proceedings if the parties are unable to reach an agreement.' Similarly,
the U.S. Department of Labor has initiated a regional pilot program
in Philadelphia for civil and criminal litigation cases within the
DOL's jurisdiction. 6
IX. ARBITRATION UNDER THE NEw YORK STATE
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The New York State Human Rights Law67 was amended in
1991 to provide for voluntary arbitration of complaints. The program,
which is still in the developmental stage, has been strongly supported
by the Labor and Employment Law Section of the New York State
Bar Association. Under the program's procedures, parties to a complaint filed with the State Human Rights Division ("Division") may,
at any time prior to the taking of testimony at a public hearing, mutually agree in writing to submit the complaint to binding arbitration
before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").6 After a seven day rescission period, the Division will issue an Order dismissing
the complaint for administrative convenience. At that time, the

61. Id. at 55,196
62. Id. at 55,195.
63. EEOC's Pilot Mediation Program Off to Slow Start, Official Says, Daily Lab. Rep
(BNA), May 4, 1993, at A-14, A-15.
64. Id. This program handles only "charges brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, in issues of discharge, discipline and terms and conditions of employment. Reasonable
accommodation, class action, and equal pay charges are not eligible for mediation." Id.
65. Letter and Memo From EEOC Legal Counsel Thomisina V. Rogers, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), Apr. 5. 1993, at F-1, F-2.
66. Labor Department's Interim Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), Feb. 28, 1992, at D-1, D-1 to D-2.
67. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(4)(ii) (McKinney 1993).
68. Id.
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Division's jurisdiction over the complaint will terminate and an arbitrator designated by the AAA will be solely responsible for hearing
and deciding the complaint.'
A "blue ribbon' panel of eighteen arbitrators has been assembled
from the fields of academia, government and private practice, from
the AAA's National Panel of Labor Arbitrators." If the parties can
not reach an agreement concerning the selection of an arbitrator, the
AAA will appoint one' In late April 1993, the first case was submitted to one of the panel members, Margery Gootnick. Under the
Division program, the parties may write whatever language they wish
into their submission agreement, including limitations on the scope
and nature of remedies. A model submission agreement has been
prepared by the Division.'
X.

MANDATORY ARBITRATION UNDER STATE

HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS

In Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,' the New York Court of
Appeals applied Gilmer to a sexual harassment claim under the New
York State Human Rights Law, overruling Wertheim & Co. v.
Halperi4 as it applied to cases governed by the FAA. The court
held that "the arbitrability of statutory discrimination claims is henceforth to be determined by reference to Congress' intent with regard to
alternative dispute resolution of that class of claims."75 The court
ordered arbitration under a U-4 agreement, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's contentions that (i) the congressional intent of Title VII
was to make anticipatory arbitration agreement unenforceable76 and
(ii) the U-4 form is an employment agreement and is therefore exk "
cluded from regulation under the FAA.

69. Id.
70. Barbara Franklin, Time-Saving Option; Human Rights Agency Now Offers Arbitration,
N.Y.LJ., Jan. 16, 1992, at 5.
71. Id.
72. In addition to the Division's program, voluntary arbitration and mediation programs
have been initiated by the New York City Human Rights Commission to "expedite the resolution of discrimination actions and substantially reduce process costs." Today's News Update,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 4, 1993, at I.
73. 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993).
74. 397 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1979).
75. Fletcher, 619 N.E.2d at 1000.
76. Id. at 1002.
77. Id. at 1005.
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In Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets,78 a federal district
court applying New Jersey's wrongful discharge law held that an
employee suing for breach of substantive portions of an employer's
handbook must exhaust the arbitration procedure imposed unilaterally
by the handbook in employment-related disputes. The court reasoned
that even if the handbook constituted an employment contract, the
plaintiff's failure to exhaust the handbook's procedural remedies precluded his claims. 9
XI.

EXTENSION OF GILMER TO

NASD ARBITRATION

Two courts have now ruled on whether the arbitration rules and
procedures of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") require arbitration of race discrimination claims. In
Spellman v. Securities, Annuities and Insurance Services, Inc.," a
California court ruled that the Gilmer decision required arbitration and
dismissal of the litigation. In Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,"' the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the NASD rules differed significantly from
the New York Stock Exchange rules which had been at issue in
Gilmer and did not on their face require arbitration of employmentrelated, as contrasted with "business-related," disputes.
XI.

THE PRELusrw EFFECr OF PRE-AREITRATION PROCEDURE

There is no U.S. Supreme Court authority directly addressing the
precise issue of whether an employer may require an unrepresented
(non-union) employee to exhaust an internal pre-arbitration grievance
procedure as a precondition to the institution of a governmental agency or court proceeding. However, the Supreme Court has historically
required employees to exhaust grievance procedures before initiating
lawsuits on claims under a variety of federal statutes. These include
employee suits against employers and unions for breach of collective
bargaining agreements or breach of the union's duty of fair representation," and suits brought by union members against their unions
78. 764 F.Supp. 940, 951 (D.NJ. 1991).
79. Id. at 950.
80. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct. App. 1992).
81. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
82. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley Act) Act of 1947 § 301(a), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988); Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (stating that employer and
union should be given the opportunity to investigate and resolve the employee's claims under
the established procedure without judicial interference so that the parties might either reach a
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under the Landrum-Griffin Act.'
Existing case law and the emerging trend clearly favor an exhaustion requirement. Historically, even before Gilmer, the courts and

Congress have recognized the benefits of requiring exhaustion. Such
benefits include an early and full investigation of the facts giving rise

to the employee's complaint, remedying or showing the lack of merit
in the complaint to the employee's satisfaction, and negotiating a
compromise solution. The courts and Congress have recognized that
any or all of these may eliminate the necessity to bring the dispute to
an already overburdened judicial system."
XII.

THE VALIDITY OF

AGREEMENTS SHORTENING TIME PERIODS

Contractual agreements that shorten a statutory time period in

which an individual may file a claim have been upheld under common law principles of contract law.' All courts considering the
question have held that contract provisions which shorten the statute

of limitations are valid between the parties provided that the time
agreed upon is not so short as to be unreasonable in light of the
circumstances."
Agreements to reduce the statute of limitations further the purposes behind the application of statutes of limitations by hastening the
institution of an action:

settlement or demonstrate that the employee's claim was without merit); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967) (rejecting the requirement of exhaustion when futile or unworkable because
of, for example, a union representative's bias); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965) (requiring the aggrieved employee to "attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by [the] employer and union as [the] mode of redress"); Wagner v. General Dynamics, 905 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1990); Monroe v. UAW, 723 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1983);
Rader v. United Transp. Union, 718 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1983) (staying § 301 actions involving the duty of fair representation pending the exhaustion of internal grievance procedures).
83. See, e.g., Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
84. See, e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
85. See, e.g., Olds v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 155 P.2d 676 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1945) (confirming the validity of a clause in an automobile liability policy which
shortened the normal statute of limitations between); cf Travelers Indem. Co. v. Rexnord,
Inc., 389 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (enforcing contractual language in a surety bond
which extended the time limit for commencement of a suit); IA ARTHUR L. CORBN, CORBIN
ON CoNTRAcTs § 218, at 311 (1963).
86. E.g., Olds v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 155 P.2d 676 (Cal. Dist. CL
App. 1945) (finding a one year statute of limitations reasonable); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Rexnord, Inc., 389 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (modifying triggering event for commencement of statutory period was allowable).
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Statutes of limitations ... in their conclusive effects are designed
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The
theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and
that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail
over the right to prosecute them."
The only grounds on which such an agreement could be held
invalid would be where its terms are unconscionable.' "The fundamental principle of law that courts will not enforce a bargain where
one party has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities and
distress of the other has found expression in an almost infinite variety
of cases."s

In Myers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co.,' for example,
the Sixth. Circuit upheld an employment agreement in which the employee agreed not to commence any action or proceeding related to
his employment more than six months after the termination of employment. Thus, the employee's age and handicap discrimination
claims, timely under Michigan state law, were dismissed.91 The court
pointed out that the agreement was knowingly and voluntarily entered
into and that the time period was long enough to investigate and
initiate proceedings.' Moreover, the court said there was nothing
inherently unreasonable in shortening a statute of limitations to six
months.'
In Bryn Mawr Hospital v. Coatesville Electric Supply Co.,' a
federal court in Pennsylvania, citing Third Circuite and U.S. Supreme Court 6 precedent, upheld a private agreement to shorten the
time period in which an ERISA claim could be initiated, from six

87. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
88. Olds v. General Acc., Fi'e & Life Assur. Corp., 155 P.2d 676 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1945).
89. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942).
90. 849 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1988).
91. Id. at 262.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 776 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
95. Hospital Support Servs., Ltd. v. Kemper Group, Inc., 889 F.2d 1311 (3d Cir. 1989)
(citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
96. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol11/iss1/6

14

Spelfogel: Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in Employ
1993]

ADR and Arbitration in Employment Disputes

years to two years, and barred the employee's suit. In Roney & Co.
v. Goren,' the Sixth Circuit upheld a stock exchange arbitration provision that shortened an otherwise applicable three-year limitations
period to bring a Section 10(b)98 fraud claim to one year citing
Myers as precedent." Similarly, in Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling
Co.,"° the Alaska Supreme Court held that an employment contract
which provided that a notice of claim must be served on the employer within thirty days of its inception and that a lawsuit may be instituted no sooner than six months and no later than twelve months
after the filing of the notice of claim was valid and not unconscionable as against public policy.
Under these principles an employer may conservatively reduce
the time in which its employees are able to file any court action
against it, to no more than the six month limitation periods already
applicable to Title VII, the NLRA, and Section 301 of Taft-Hartley.
XIV.

THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS WAIVING JURY TRIALS

It is well settled that although the right to trial by jury is constitutionally guaranteed under the Seventh Amendment, an individual
may knowingly and intentionally waive this right in civil cases."'
Each case is fact specific; the language of waiver must be easily
visible"ra and, preferably, either the subject of discussion or of past
practice between the parties." In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Hendrix, for example, the Second Circuit refused to enforce a waiver
of the right to a jury trial because the waiver was buried in a lengthy
legal document and the facts and circumstances showed that the waiv97. 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989).
98. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
100. 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1962). See also Bernacchio v. Roadway Package Sys., Civ.
No. 92-4832-TCP (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1993) (dismissing action for wrongful termination of
independent contractor relationship for failure to file suit within 90-day contractually shortened
limitations period).
101. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 373 F.2d 136 (8th
Cir. 1967); National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Orix
Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Better Built Corp., No. 89 CIV. 7333, 1990 WL 96992 (S.D.N.Y.
July 2, 1990); FSLIC v. Var-Cap Corp., No. CV-86-3582, 1987 WL 12026 (E.D.N.Y. May
12, 1987); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); cf., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
102. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
103. See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Better Built Corp., No. 89 CIV. 7333, 1990
WL 96992 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1990); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572
F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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er was neither knowing nor voluntary."°+
The Northwest Airlines case is particularly relevant in that it
involved a union-employer agreement to submit certain types of disputes to a Systems Board, and expressly provided for a waiver of any

constitutional right to a jury trial."r The Eighth Circuit, citing
Steelworkers Trilogy,i°e noted a congressional and judicial policy
voring compulsory arbitration in employment disputes."° Indeed,
holdings of Gilmer and its progeny (that agreements to arbitrate

the
fathe
are

enforceable and block court litigation) validate the enforceability of a

waiver of the right to a jury trial by inference."
XV.

THE CONSENSUAL NATURE OF ARBITRATION

Private sector arbitration in the United States is essentially a
voluntary consensual matter.'" The parties must agree between
themselves to arbitrate and on the procedures they will utilize. As
with any contract, an employee's "agreement" to arbitrate may not be
enforceable if the agreement is not voluntary and has not been given
'
in exchange for valuable "consideration.""..
Attorneys for employees
seeking to void mandatory arbitration agreements, entered into at
either the time of hiring or a subsequent point in their employment,
have argued that the agreement was the product of unequal bargaining
power, 1was not truly voluntary, and was lacking in legal "consider11

ation."

As stated above, the Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected an argu-

104. 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
105. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1967).
106. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
107. Northwest Airlines, 373 F.2d at 142.
108. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. 1647. See also Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d
698 (2d Cir. 1985) (enforcing a U-4 arbitration agreement in a pre-Gilmer decision by stating
that "[i]n
our view the district court found that Smiga had entered into an agreement to
arbitrate. We therefore conclude that she had no right to a jury trial .... *).
109. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468 (1989); Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990).
110. Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826-28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 964 (1987); EEOC v. American Express Publishing Co., 681 F. Supp. 216, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
111. Margaret Poppe, Is Arbitration Fair?, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Apr. 20, 1992, at
14; EEOC Commissioner Speaks Out Against Compulsory Arbitration of Bias Claims, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 25, 1991, at A-9.
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ment of unequal bargaining power."' Requiring mandatory ADR as
a term and condition of new employment would be no different than
application of a starting wage, a vacation or sick leave policy or
requiring the signing of a confidentiality agreement and, thus, would
clearly be supported by legal consideration.
A more difficult question arises with respect to current employees. Legal consideration could be established by tying in the implementation of ADR and mandatory arbitration with a job promotion,
wage increase, or a new profit sharing or other benefit plan. On the
other hand, providing a less formal, speedier and less expensive adjudication of a dispute by a neutral third party, and an employer waiving the right to trial and its attendant procedural advantages"' may
be sufficient consideration.
An argument could be made that continued employment under
changed terms and conditions constitutes consideration, or waiver or
estoppel of the right to complain. This view has been adopted by the
New York Appellate Division in Zellner v. Conrad,"4 holding that
forbearance of the employer's right to terminate a contract or employment at-will is, by itself, sufficient legal detriment which may
stand as consideration for a covenant entered into during an ongoing
relationship.
XVI. ADR AND ARBrnTATION PROCEDURES
The goals and advantages of any ADR or arbitration mechanism
are to reduce the risks, costs and often lengthy delays associated with
an over-burdened legal system that in the opinion of many is out of
control; to preserve workplace unity; to foster and improve internal
communication and employee morale; to provide employees with an
outside option where they do not believe internal processes are fair;
and to diminish legal expenses." 5 Plaintiffs' attorneys also emphasize management's concern with avoiding the uncertainty of unduly
high, sympathy laden jury verdicts.1 6 Union officials also view ADR

112. 111 S. Ct. at 1655.
113. These advantages include pretrial discovery, formal rules of evidence and the possibility of appeal.
114. 589 N.Y.S.2d 903 (App. Div. 1992).
115. State Litigators Watching as Arbitration Zooms as Fastest Growing Legal Trend, 7
WARFIELD's Bus. REC. 44 (1992); Reske, supra note 4; Barbara Franklin, Time-Saving Option; Human Rights Agency Now Offers Arbitration, N.Y.U., Jan. 16, 1992; Michael A.
Verespej, Arbitration; The Newest Legal Option, INDUS. WK., July 15, 1991, at 56.
116. See supra text accompanying note 11. See also Employers Reluctant to Embrace
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and arbitration as yet another management way to perpetuate a unionfree environment.1 7
Whatever the motivation, comprehensive dispute resolution/
avoidance programs should be designed first to investigate, conciliate
and resolve potential problems as they arise, and thereafter, when
internal "venting" has failed, to adjudicate through more formal ADR
processes. A mandatory series of pre-arbitration steps directed toward
the extra-judicial resolution of grievances is a valuable safeguard.
Pursuant to this process (similar to grievance procedures under union
contracts) employees would (i) communicate and review problems and
concerns with immediate supervisors; (ii) submit unresolved problems
to higher levels of management; and (iii) participate in peer review
and/or mediation. Thereafter the parties would be required to submit
remaining unresolved disputes to final and binding arbitration before a
neutral agency."'
Under the arbitration procedure, the parties would merely substitute the arbitral forum for a court, with all available substantive rights
and remedies which might be available in a court of relevant jurisdiction available before the arbitrator."' This would best ensure a
court's giving preclusive effect to the arbitrator's award, and to an
employee's failure to exhaust available internal pre-arbitration dispute
resolution processes.

XVIl. PRACICAL PROBLEMS
In establishing an arbitration mechanism, there are a number of
practical issues to consider. Opponents of ADR often cite one or
more of these to justify advising clients against giving up rights to
judicial adjudication. These include whom to select as arbitrator, the
scheduling of hearings, pre-hearing discovery, rules of evidence, the

Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, 1992 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 30, 1992, at A-14.
117. The Antiunion Grievance Ploy, Bus. WY., Feb. 12, 1979, at 117.
118. It is interesting to note, however, that the district court in California did uphold the
decision of an arbitration panel made up of the company's senior vice president of human
resources, the divisional vice president, and a company manager of plaintiff's choosing, rather
than an impartial outside arbitrator. Delaney v. Continental Airlines Corp., No. 92-762-OLT
(C.D. Cal. June 22, 1993). See also Firing of Airline Supervisor Upheld Despite Legal Dispute on Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), July 8, 1993, at D-5 (reporting Delaney).
119. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
"By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id. at 628.
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applicability of traditional concepts of attorney-work product and
attorney-client privilege, and the nature of the remedy.
A. The Selection of Arbitrators
The best answer is often the most obvious - seek out experienced attorneys, knowledgeable with respect to discrimination laws,
who will be impartial and fair." Some labor arbitrators believe they
should not decide statutory issues, while others are not trained or
qualified to do so. Available sources of qualified arbitrators include
the American Arbitration Association's National Panel of Labor Arbitrators, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS), the
Center for Public Resources, Inc. (CPR), Dispute Management, Inc.
(Rent-a-Judge), Endispute, and similar organizations. Whatever the
source, potential arbitrators must be carefully screened as to their
qualifications, backgrounds and proclivities.
B. Discovery
Generally, unless the parties provide otherwise in their arbitration
mechanism, prehearing discovery is not available in conventional
labor arbitration, although it may be available in commercial arbitration.'21 Experience shows, however, that employees' counsel often
press in arbitration for the same type of discovery available in court
proceedings, including interrogatories, requests to produce documents,
Thus, either the
requests to admit and even depositions."
on this point, or
be
specific
should
procedure
arbitration
employer's
care must be taken to incorporate by reference the rules of the preferred arbitration agency.
Normally, a party is entitled to subpoena for production at the
hearing relevant documents and records and the presence of witness-

120. See Yaroslav Sochynsky, No Alternative to Understanding the Law, THE RECORDER,
Aug. 23, 1993, at 8.
121. See Stephen P. Younger, Structuring ADR Proceedings, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 20, 1993, at

1; Mark A. Buckstein, Why the Process Works, N.Y.LU., Nov. 5, 1992, at 3.
122. Depositions are rarely allowed; however, an arbitrator may be flexible if essential
witnesses are unavailable. Id. See Koch Fuel Int'l Inc. v. M/V South Star, 118 F.R.D. 318
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing depositions, where the parties have agreed to arbitrate their dispute
and where the testimony sought is that of crew members preparing to depart the country who
will thus most likely be unavailable to provide testimony in this dispute in the future, in
addition to permitting a physical inspection of the ship and appropriate access to its records
pursuant to a limited discovery agreement between the parties).
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es.'" The granting of a continuance to review material produced at
a hearing or for subpeona enforcement would be at the arbitrator's
discretion.
C. Scheduling
Most arbitrators are unable to schedule consecutive days for a
particular hearing, without advance notice. To avoid the parties having
to prepare again after each delay, with attendant loss of continuity
and increased expense, parties should request an initial scheduling
conference and set aside enough consecutive days to complete the
case at one sitting." Indeed, the availability of the arbitrator to hear
and deign the case promptly should be one of the considerations in
the selection process.
D. Rules of Evidence and Privilege
Rules of evidence do not typically apply in arbitration. Arbitration is generally less formal and some arbitrators are apt to receive
into evidence almost anything "for what it's worth."'" Some arbitrators do not give proper deference to the attorney-client and workproduct privileges generally applicable in courts." To minimize
problems, the parties should attempt in the selection process to identify potential arbitrators who are attorneys and who are known from
past experience and reported decisions to keep a tighter reign on the
conduct of the hearing and to exclude irrelevancies and privileged
matter.

123.

Sochynsky, supra note 120, at 8.

124. According to statistical data provided by the American Arbitration Association Department of Case Administration, the median processing time for labor arbitration cases from
filing to award in 1992 was 219 days. Without proper planning, cases which require multiple
hearing days will result in further delays.

125. A 1984 "survey disclose[d] that the most experienced and the busiest arbitrators have
a tendency to admit disputed material into evidence 'for what it is worth."' Survey Shows
Arbitrators Agree on Thought and Practice of Work, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Dec. 10,

1984, at 2272. See also National Academy of Arbitrators Explores Limits on Arbitrators
Power to Conduct Hearing, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), June 5, 1989, at A-8; Hearsay and
Circumstantial Evidence Not Enough to Support Discipline, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA),

May 20, 1985, at 744.
126. See J. Lani Bader & Francis 0. Spalding, Maintaining Confidences in ADR, THE
RECORDER, Apr. 21, 1992.
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E. Remedies
Unless the parties expressly provide otherwise in the arbitration
mechanism, arbitrators are generally empowered with the same remedial authority as judges. This would include, for example, the authority to award back pay, reinstatement, front pay and other make whole
orders (including related fringe benefits), and compensatory damages.
The courts are divided on whether arbitrators may award punitive
damages, with both federal and state courts holding that under New
York law, arbitrators generally do not have authority to award punitive damages.'" Moreover, in Thoreson v. Penthouse International
Ltd., the New York Court of Appeals held in 1992 that punitive
damages are not awardable under the State Human Rights Law,
whether before the courts or in administrative proceedings before the
New York State Division of Human Rights.
In view of the existence of conflicting decisions and contradictory commentary, drafters of arbitration procedures may be tempted to
include language expressly prohibiting the awarding of punitive damages. Such a restriction, however, creates a greater risk that an arbitration procedure will not be given preclusive effect because it does
not allow, even on its face, for the same range of remedies available
in a court of the relevant jurisdiction.

XVIII.

RECENT NEW USES OF

ADR AND ARBrIRATION

A. Payment of Agency Fee "Dues"
On April 16, 1993, in Abrams v. Communications Workers,1
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected mandatory arbitration of disputes under union procedures for handling agency fee objections under the Supreme Court's 1988 Beck" decision.
The district court held that the Communication Workers' unilaterally
established procedures for mandatory arbitration of disputes over the

127. See Fahnestock Co., v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) (holding arbitrators do not have the authority to award
punitive damages even in cases where the parties have agreed that such damages are
awardable). Contra Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir.
1988).
128. 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992).
129. 818 F. Supp. 393 (D.D.C. 1993).
130. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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allocation of expenses violated the union's duty of fair representation.' The court further elaborated that the arbitration policy in the
union constitution could not be extended to force non-members to
accept the union's choice of dispute resolution.
B. Industry-Wide Arbitration
In the aftermath of Gilmer, employers in a number of industries
have been exploring the establishment of industry-wide arbitration
panels, and the negotiation of multi-employer agreements to arbitrate disputes over restrictive covenants, and non-compete and confidentiality agreements. Parties to such industry ADR mechanisms
would create panels of neutrals with expertise in the industry, and
establish safeguards, rights and remedies similar to those established
by the New York Stock Exchange and enforced by the Supreme
Court in Gilmer. They would thereby avoid the question left open by
the Gilmer decision concerning the meaning of the exclusion in Section 1 of the FAA."
XIX.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

ADR, including arbitration, works in cases of pure contract interpretation and under those employment related statutes where the
courts have allowed it. Given proper safeguards, checks and balances,
there is no reason why it would not work in cases involving statutory
discrimination under the civil rights laws.
The Supreme Court's Gilmer decision and its progeny signal a
growing acceptance of arbitration of statutory employment claims.
Whether the courts ultimately grant preclusive, or at least "exhaustion," effect to pre-arbitration grievance procedures or prospective
agreements to arbitrate discrimination and other statutory employment
disputes, need not be the determining factor in deciding to utilize
ADR. Clearly, decisions of arbitrators in such cases will be upheld
with respect to basic contract, tort and other nonstatutory work-related
claims. Even if nonbinding, arbitration awards may be given "signif-

131. Abrams, 818 F. Supp. at 406-07.
132. Id.
133. One industry to attempt the establishment of industry-wide arbitration is the securities
industry. See GAO Probe Of Industry Arbitration Of Job Discrimination Claims Nears End,
Sec. Reg. and L. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 5, 1993, at 185.
134. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1651 n.2.
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icant weight," be deemed persuasive and collaterally estop relitigation
of covered statutory issues.
Often an employee wishes merely to be heard by an impartial
ear at an early stage in the dispute. Litigation is not yet within contemplation at this point. In addition, ADR generally improves the
quality of supervision and employee morale, forcing supervisors to act
more reasonably, consistently and in accordance with established
company policies and practices.
AAA survey results show that companies are using ADR mechanisms more frequently since Gilmer. Twenty-five percent of survey
respondents reported installing an arbitration provision." These employers recognize not only the benefits from a speedier and less expensive process, but the often overlooked benefit of relieving pressures building up from unresolved festering grievances."
The flood of cases into the courts across the United States has
reached epidemic proportions. Civil caseloads have increased by over
30% in the past five years and are escalating geometrically.'" ADR
presents the only proven alternative. The American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the New York State Human Rights Division and
other state and local organizations and universities have all embarked
on an expedited program of arbitrator development, particularly aimed
at identifying and enlisting persons from minority backgrounds as
potential arbitrators.'
Employers are urged to modify and improve existing ADR procedures and establish them where they are lacking. They are additionally urged to give serious consideration to adopting mandatory prearbitration grievance step procedures, shortened time limitation periods, waivers of the right to jury trials and either voluntary ad hoc, or
mandatory final and binding arbitration for all employment related
disputes.
Employees/plaintiffs and their attorneys would be well advised to
give serious consideration to submitting disputes to ADR and arbitration.
Finally, arbitrators must educate themselves with respect to the

135. See Remarks of Robert Coulson, President, American Arbitration Association, Individual Empl. Rights (BNA), Mar. 30, 1993, at 4.
136. Id.

137. See supra part I.
138. Evan . Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, ARB. J.,
Mar. 1993, at 6, 14-15.
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statutory issues they will be asked to consider, and better equip themselves with the tools needed to serve in this essential role.
Unless all of us work together in support of ADR and, particularly, final and binding arbitration, our adversarial system of dispute
resolution will surely breakdown.
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